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taken from him.
was denied June 14,
l., vott>d for a

Xo. Gl75.

Jn Bauk .

.fAMES G. BHYAXT. as Director of Emplo;•mt'Ilt, et a1., Petiv. INDT'STIUAL ..:\CCIDEN'l' COMMISSION,
Hespomle11t.
(1] Unemployment Insurance---Ineligibility for Unemployment Disability Benefits.-'l'he clear intent of the Legislature in enactInsurance
~ 207(b) (Stats. Jst Ex. Sess.
ch.
§ 1, as amended in 1947; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 8780d) is to disqualify an applicant for unemployment disability benefits for a period of unemployment which is due to
a
for which he is entitled to workmen's compensation.
[2] Id.-Right to Unemployment Disability Benefits.--The LegislaLab. Code, § 4903
, in 1947, did not change
receive
disability
a means for the recovery by the
Stabilization
on final determinathe Industrial Aceident Commission of the eligibility of
an
for workmen's compensation, of the amount of
unemployment disability benefits paid to the applicant hy the
former commission during the period of uncertainty pending
such final de termination.

Insurance, § 8.1;
1Vorkmen's Compensation,
220.

and permanent u"'"u•1uc.)
does not indicate
effect on the construction

tPrnn.Cl-r"'-rv

a

intended to have
ployment Insurance

to review an order
Commission awarding compensation for
of award refusing to allow elairn of lien
pensation
annulled with directions.
]'red N Howser and Edmund G.
eral, Chas. \V. Johnson,
H.
and Vineent P. Lafferty, Deputy
tioners.
Sidney h
tioner!'l.

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Peti.

Edmund ,f.
Respondent.

'1'.

and Robert Ball for

Charles P. Seully, as Amieus Curiae on behalf of Hespondent.
SCHAUER,
the Direetor of Employment
and the Department of Employment, seek review of an award
of respondent Industrial Aeeident
and annulment of the portion of the a\Yard whieh denies
daim of a lien against certain workmen's compensation
awarded to Herbert R. \Vade. On ,Tune
\Vade sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. He instituted
before the Industrial
Accident Commission to recover
During the pendency of such
See 27 Cal.Jur. 546.
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mrn's
are entitled
Prtitiom•rs rontrnd that
1o a lien against workmen
for the entire amount
paid as unemployment disability
regardll'ss of whether
the 'WOrkmen
,,,as a\-rarded for temporary disability or for permanent disahilit;;-. The Industrial Accident
Commission eontencls that in every case it has discretion as to
whether it will a1lo•x a lien against workmen's compensation;
that when• the (•1aimrr1 lien is for nnemployment disabilit:·
benefits it would hr an abusr of discretion to deny the lirn
for benefits paid (luring a period of temporary disability, but
that thr eommission "is fully justified" in denying a lien for
benefits paid during a prriod of permanent disability. Amicus
euriae State Federation of J_,abor eontends that as a rnatter
of law an unemployed. disabled applicant is entitled to both
nnemployment disahilit.'· betwfits and \Yorkmen 's permanent
disabilit;'
Tiesolntion of the variom; rontentions depends npon
of the l;abor Corlf• rm(l tl1e
I'Hemplo;vnwni Tmmrancr Aet I 8 Derring's Gen. T1aws, Ar1
~7RO(l).
Com:i<leration of the prrtinent statntor.\· provisions
]pads to the conelusion that the ]Wtitioners as a matter of la\Y
'The
Insurance Act (:l Deering's Gen.
§
par.
i!efines ''unemployment compensation
benefits' a;;'' money payments . . . to nn
1memplo.''Nl indiYidual with
respect to his wage losses due to
as a result of illness or
otl1er disability resulting in such
lwing nnaYailn hle or una hle
to work due to snch illness OJ' disability.''
"The Labor Code ((> 4903, par. (f) quoted infra), provides for such
a lien.

of
state."
85.) The committee recommended
program "to pay benefits to individbecause
illness or injury
otherwise made"
p. 126; italfurther recommended ''That no disability
to an individual

any ·week ·which
zation Commission] finds
to receive . . . benefits

commission

Section
for unto
Stabilireceived or is entitled
a workmen's compensation law
disabled applicant
disability
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version of
to section
that "The
may deteramount to be
as
services in connt>etion with the claim for
Reasonable
expcnst>s for medical treatment of the industrial
Heasonable value of
expenses
lllJniT.
R0asonable burial expens0s of deceased
(e) Heasonable
expenses of deserted wife or minor
children. Paragraph
, added in 1947, reads, "The amount
of unemployment compensation
benefits which have
been paid under or pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance
Act in those cases
a determination under
Division 4 of this
there was
whether such
benefits were payable under that act or payable hereunder.''
Paragraph
, added in 1949,
"The amount of unemployment compensation benefits paid erroneously to the injured employee for a period for which he was unable to work
and for which he received
total disability payments
under this division."
[2] It does not appear that the
by
paragraph
to section 4903 of the Labor Code in 1947,
ehanged the
of an applicant to receive
disability benefits; it
a means for the Unemployment Stabilization Commission to recover such benefits
when it was finally determined
the Industrial Accident
Commission that the
was entitled to workmen's
The reason for
such means is
is not entitled to unemployment disobvious. An
ability benefits for a period of unemployment which, according
to the findings of the Unemployment Stabilization Commis-

tion under
whether such benefits were
Insurance
or
[3] It is the commission 's3
section
4903 proyides that it ''
' allow a lien and because '' '
§ 1 , it "may" in its discretion
is permissive" (Lab.
refuse to allow liens under section 4903. 'I'he
eases
suggest that the commission's ''discretion'' as to liens under
paragraphs
through
of section
though wide,
does not inelude "discretion" to disallow
a lien
where it is established that the lien claimant did furnish
servi(~es or living expenses of value: Independence Indem. Co.
v. Industrial Arc. Com. (1935), 2 CaL2d 397, 404, 407 [41
P.2d 320] Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.
(1938), 10 Cal.2d 567, 578
P.2d 1058];
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1920), 47 Cal.App. 190, 192 [190 P. 373);
Safway Steel etr. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn. (1942), 55 CaL
App.2d 388, 389 [130 P.2d 484] ; Bentley v. Industrial Ace.
Cmn. (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 547, 549 [171 P.2d
'rhe
eommi8sion relies on D1: Pasqua v.lnclustrial Ace. Cmn. (1949),
14 Cal.Comp. Cases 251, 252, in support of its contention that
section 4903 gi ,·es it ''discretion'' to disallow a proved lien.
fn that ease there were proper
for disallowing the
lien, and any
that the commission had "discretion" to deny a proved lien was not necessary to its decision.
A goorl example of the sort of discretion whieh the eommission
has under seetion 4903 is
v. J[elly
, 6 CaLComp.
Cases 307. There the unpaid balance of compensation was in8nffkient to pay the claimed liens for rent and attorney's fee.
'rhe commission divided the amount available pro rata between
the two lien claimants on the theory that this was the most
equitable way to obtain the desired
that
not to dis'The word "commission" as used in this discussion, unless otherwise
indicated, refers to the Industrial Accident Commission.
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time
argues as follo-ws: Permant:nt
intended to
the employe
with sustemmee while he rehabilitates himself and
to
his new

JJlotor Vehicles v.

Ace.

), 14 Ca1.2d ]89, 192
P.2d 131]). Temporary
since it is measured by a fraction of
wages
§§ 4653, 4654) is intended to partially eomprnsate for loss of ,,·ages. cnemployment disability brnefits
too are intended "to compensate in
for the wage loss
sustained
individuals unemployed because of sickness or
Deering's Gen. IJaws. r\et 8780d, § 150). Therefore, it is proper that the 1vorkman should not receive both
temporary disability
and unemployment disability benefits at the same
since both are intended to
for the same loss; it is equally proper that the
Workman should receive unemployment disability benefits
(just as he might receiYe
during the time he is receiving permanent disability eompensation and adjusting himself to his new, disabled status. The eommission asserts, further. that paragraph (b 1 of section 207 of the Unemployment
lnsnranee ,\et (qnoted s11pm. pp. 218-2HI) does not precludr
simultaneous payment of
disability compensation
and unemployment disability benefits, beeause the perman(>nt
disability r;omprnsation is not payable "for any week of unemployment dtH' primarily to a disability"; rather. it is
pa?ablr becausr of the
's changed, permanently disAbled condition. This tortuous eonstruction reaches a result
whieh, as we have alrrady im1ieated, nppears to us to be eontrary to the
intent. Sneh
to be snrP, agrres
with Industrial Accident Commission policy whieh has a
rpasonable theoretical basis. But it is the Legislature, not the
eommission. whieh sets the limits within which the eommission
ean arlopt and rarry out

'l'he State Fe(leration of T1abor urges that the Unem;md the I1abor Code
who
benefits
the
the purpose of
agTees \Yith the
between the nature
loss of

distinction
(for
(for
It construes paraof section 4fl03 of the f_~abor Code to mean, as indithe bracketed
that the Industrial Aecia lien ''The amount of unbenefits
paywhich have been paid
Insurance Act in those case:;;
Division 4 of this

is not''
'' becanse it is not a

and

his age at the time
to the diminished
pete in an open labor market.''
atldecL) 'fhat is to say,
for wages actually lost while
pairment of """"""''n"
lyzed by this court in Department
111otor Vehicles v. Industrial Accident
14 Cal.2d 189, 191 [93 P.2d
131] : '''I' he rule is well recognized that,
ployee is entitled to an award for
out regard to the
wages after the injury.
the inability to return to reemployment is not a test for an
allowance of permanent disability is determined by the Labor
Code itself. Section 4660 thereof provides that, in determining the percentage of permanent disability, account shall be
taken of the nature of the physical
or disfigurement,
the occupation of the
employee, and his age at the
time of such
"In Postal Tel. etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
213 Cal.
644 [3 P.2cl 6], the rule is announced that wages earned by
and paid to an injured employee subsequent to an a-ward of
compensation for a
could not be credited
against such
holding, in accordance with the rule
followed in several industrial
that the disability referred to in the statute was not such
as impaired
pou~er
but embraced any loss of physical functions which detracted from the former efficiency in
the ordinary pursuits of life. It is the prospective loss of
future
power under the
handicap of physical
impairment that is to be considered and
to do the
exact work
done by the
measure of disability." (Italics added.) It is clear therefore
that temporary disability payments under workmen's compensation laws are a substitute for wages lost by the em-

22:>

with ·wages,
is dear.
individual shall
week in
because of his
he is unable to perform his
Insurance
Stats.
p. 1226, as amended, § 201. Italics added.)
'l'he amount of b('nefits is computed on the basis of the wages
}ntyabk
§§
20:5),
as noted in the majority
opinion, the refereuce is to the "weeks" the employee ree<,ives benefits under the \Yorlnnen 's Compensation Act, all
pointing to the conelusion that vv-ages, not earning capacity,
is the basis for computing nnemployment disability benefits.
That pet'lnanent disabiLity payments should not be deducted
from unemployment disability payments, or vice versa, is
patently sensible. 'l'hc former are for the loss for life of the
<:apacity to earn a living. 'l'hey are not apportioned according
to c<'rtain periods of ti tnt>, that is, one installment does not
represent the payment for the loss of earning capacity for
the instaUment period. The latter, however, are directly
apportioned to each week and on the basis of the wages that
would have been paid for that week had the employee not been
disabled. There is, therefore, insufficient similarity between
the two to justify balancing one against the other.
The only anS>Yer made by the majority opinion to the foregoing eonstruction of the statute is that it is "tortuous."
On the contrary it is wholly reasonable and eompelled by the
rNpiir·ement that workm<m 's c-ompensation Jmvs be liberally
eonstrned to pres0ne their benefits to their beneficiaries.
Code, § 3202.)
F'urthermore, my eonstruction of the act is necessitated by
the theory of workmen's eompensation that industry shall
bear the burden of industrial injuries.
Cal.Jur. 256.)
Under the Unemployment Insuranee Act ( § 44) the employee eontributrs to the fund from which the benefits are
payablr. 'ro that extr.nt,
not inclustry, is bearing the
cost of an industrial injury.
37

C.2d-~

where the +m.. ~A?~
exeeeds
per cent of the
the injured employee shall
75 per
eent of snch permanent disability payment in addition to the
temporary disability payment. ' (Stats.
ch. 1335.)
rn 1 947 the partial recovery was inereased as follows: ''Where
nn injury causes both temporary and
disability,
the injured employee is entitled to compensation for any
disability sustained
him in addition to any
payment received by such
for temporary
disability; provided, however, that where the permanent
disability rating is 707o or greater, it slmli be conclusively
presumed that temporary disability did not exceed 104 weeks.''
(Stats. 1947, ch. 1132.) .B'inally in 1949, the Legislature
went the whole way and allowed both
and permanent disability compensation to be paid. It stated: "\Vhere an
injury causes both temporary and permanent disability, the
injured employee is entitled to compensation for any permanent disability sustained by him in addition to any payment
received by s~tch 'tnjm·ed employee for temporary disability."
(Stats. 1949, ch. 107. Italics added.) Here is a clear mandate of the Legislature that the pennanent disability compensation shall not be diminished by any payment of temporary disability compensation. 'rhat is to say, the "loss of
wages'
disability compensation-shall not reduce
the "loss of earning capacity'
disability compensation. But under the strained construction of the statutes
gi \'en in the majority opinion that mandate is completely
ignored. It says that the unemployment disability payment,
which is for the loss of wages
, the same as temporary
<1isability compensation, must be ded'Icted from the permanent <lisability compensation allowed for loss of earning
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C.2d 227; 231 P.2d 26]

with one hand and take
rrhe Industrial Aeeideut Commission construed the statutes
lwre involved in accord with the views herein
and
eoncede that the policy of the Commission in so
the statutes has a "reasonable theoretical basis."
What 1s meant
the latter phrase is not clear in view of
1llr
and eonelusion reached in the majority opinion.
If it is meant that the
placed upon the statutes
b~' the Commission is
then it should be adopted
h.v this conrt. rrhat such construction is reasonable and not
'' tortnous'' 1s obvious from the foregoing discussion.
For the
reasons I would affirm the a>Yard.

F. Xo. 18:2M.
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Cl'l'Y AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v.
THE STJPBRIOH COUHT OF THB CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN F'HANCISCO et al., Respondents.
Witnesses- Privileged Communications- Physician and Paunder Code Civ. Proc.,
~ 1881
no treatment is contcmexists between plaintiff

tient.~· The

eontcntion that
107 A.L.R. 1495.

